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SU_4ARY
This paper reviews the use of motivational techniques in human perfor- '
mance research and presents an example study employing a reward-penalty
_ structure to simulate the motivations inherent in a real-world
._ situation. The influence of motivation on human performance has been an
issue since the beginning of behavioral science. Most often, motivation is
controlled through procedures designed to minimize its influence as an uncon-
: trolled variable. Driver behavior in a decision-making driving scenario was
studied.
The task involved control of an instrumented car on a cooperative test i
course. Subjects were penalized monetarily for tickets and accidents and re- _i
: _ warded for saving driving time. Two groups were assigned different ticket
penalties. The group with the highest penalties tended to drive more conser-
vatively. However, the average total payoff to each group was the same, as
the conservative drivers traded off slower driving times with lower ticket
penalties.
J
- INTRODUCTION
i Reward-penalty structures have existed since the beginning of experimen- _
tatlon, and the effects of such structures have evolved into a separate area _
:_ of research. As early as 1922, A. M. Johanson observed the effects of re-
wards and penalties on reaction times. These classic results (cited in Ref. J- I) are shown in Fig. I. Researchers have examined the motivational aspects(Refs. 2-6), .looked at rewards' distracting effects (Refs. 7-10), and
looked at the positive effects of rewards (Refs 11 and 12). What does this
experimentation mean, and how can the researcher of today utilize the efforts i!
_' of others? _
Subject motivation is a primary concern in any experiment. "We want the
,_: subject motivated to come back for 12 experimental sessions;" or "we want the '_
f subject motivated to respond as quickly as possible;" or "we want the subject -'i_
motivated to respond in a manner consistent with his or her normal
_ behavior." Rewards and penalties play an important part in this motivation. •[
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Figure I. Change in the Distribution of Reaction
Time Under the Influence of Incentives. Auditory
stimulus. In the "incentive series" O was informed
of his last RT; in the "punishment series" he re-
ceived a shock in the finger when the reaction was
at all slow. Each curve shows the distribution of
3600 single reactions obtained from three Os whose
times were nearly the same. (Adapted from Ref. 1)
#
To assess reward-penalty structures with regard to their consequences,
and to develop a structure for a given experiment, requires a basic knowledge
of the literature, terminology, and present methodologies. This paper is a
review of the present body of _nowledge with an emphasis on reward-penalty
design coneequp_ces for human performance research.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Definitions
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation should be an !
important consideration when designing a reward-penalty structure. If a per- i
son chooses to work a series of complex mathematical problems because of per- Isonal enjoyment, then the "perceived locus of causality" (Ref. 6) is inter-
hal, and the task is intrinsically motivating. If, however, the porson i
chooses to work the problems to gain an external reward, and the "perceived i
locus of causality" is external, then the task is extrinsically motivating
(Refs. 3, 4, 6, 13-15).
Deci (Refs. 2 and 3), Deci, Benware, and Landy (Ref. 4), and Edwards
(Ref. 16), all point out that reward-penalty structures can be designed to
be either extrinsicallymotivating or neutral. If the experimenter chooses
to have the structure of neutral influence on the subject, and at the same
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time achieve high subject motivation, it becomes necessary to use a task that !
_ has been, or can be, shown to be intrinsically interesting to the subject pc- t
I pulation. If the choice is to have a structure that makes the reward or pen-
alty contingent on performance, or in some other way extrinsically motivat- _!
ing, then the choice of experimental task is of secondary consideration. It
has been shown by Lepper and others (Refs. 3, 4, 13, and 14) that subjects
performing tasks of high intrinsic motivation, receiving extrinsic rewards,
i perceive the locus of causality to be external, and show low intrinsic moti-
vation.
Purpose of Rewards and Penalties
j
! As pointed out by Edwards (Ref. 16), rewards and penalties can serve
three purposes: I) motivators, 2) information givers, and 3) instructions.
_ If the subject is rewarded only for participation in an experiment, then the
i. reward serves as a motivator; the subject will perceive the locus of causali-
i ty as internal, and the experimental task" will be intrinsically
motivating. If the reward-penalty structure is changed, and task performance
is rewarded the reward or penalty will serve as information, in addition to
any motivating influence it has. If the experimental task is solving complex
mathematical problems, and the subject is paid hourly for experimental parti-
cipation, then task performance is unrelated to the reward, and the reward's
purpose is that of a motivator. If the reward is increased as a function of
problem completion time, or number of problems solved, the reward takes on J
the additional quality of an information giver. In this case it is important
to note that correct response is not required.
If correct response is required for a reward increase, or incorrect res-
ponse is punished, the reward also serves as an instruction. In this case
the reward not only provides motivation and information, it now tells the
subject the relative desirability of a specific response. Withholding the
reward until the completion of the experiment doesnot alter its motivational
or instructional qualities. Because the rewaro is performance related, with-
holding payment (or information about the reward "earned") only eliminates
the informational feedback quality.
Form of Rewards and Penalties
Rewards and penalties can take many forms, and the type of reward or pen-
alty chosen by the experimenter should be an important part of the
reward-penalty desIFn. The overall effe, t of the reward or penalty needs to
be assessed prior to its introduction in the experiment. For example, Deci
(Ref. 2) found that monetary rewards caused a decrease in intrinsic motiva-
tion, while rewards by use of verbal reinforcement caused an increase.
McCloskey (Ref. 17), in her work with staff turnover rates, found that psy-
chological rewards such as recognition, help from peers, and educational op-
portunities were more important in keeping an employee than salary or Job
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benefits; and that money alone would not keep an employee. Viesti (Ref. 18)
found that on an insightful learning task pay made no difference in perfor-
m_t_c e.
One of the most commonly used rewards is money. Many researchers have
examined the advantages and pitfalls of this reward form, and their findings
can be of great assistance in developing a reward-penalty structure.
Money seems to provide the best balance between response and error rate.
Daniels, et al.(Ref. 11), found that response speed remained constant, but a
drastic reduction in error rate was observed when real instead of imaginary
money was used. Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Edwards (Ref. 19) found that sub- _,
Jeers employed simpler decision strategies in an imaginary incentive design
than with real payoffs. Also Slovic (Ref. 20) found that when subjects made
hypothetical choices, they maximized gain and discounted losses; however,
when their choices had real consequences, the subjects were considerably more
cautious.
The researcher should be cautioned by the work of Greenberg (Ref. 21)
and Leventhal and Whiteside (Ref. 22), however. They have shown that mone-
tary reward can be used to motivate performance, but that overreward is fre-
quently employed. In some cases the overrewardlng tendency was so strong
that higher rewards were given to lower performing workers. Furthermore,
Spence (Refs. 8 and 9), Miller and Es_es (Ref. 10), and McGraw and McCull- j
ers (Ref. 7) point out that increased rewards may draw attention from the
experimental task.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
The above research findings clearly show the need for appropriate
reward-penalty designs, both in form and magnitude. The followlng examples,
part of a study on alcohol-driver interaction, show how this information can
be used to create a reward-penalty structure.
In a study concerning the effects of alcohol on drivers' decision making
behavior, two separate experiments were conducted. The first was run in our
fixed-base driving simulator (Ref. 23) and the second in an instrumented
vehicle designed for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Ref.
24).
In both experiments the sutject was required to complete a driving sce-
nario in both sober and intoxicated states. The following is a brief discus-
sion of the requirements, design, and effects of variatlonsin a motivational
reward-penaltystructure.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Reward-PenaltyStructure
Driving in the real world is motivated by a variety of counteracting in-
centives. Drivers wish to minimize trip time but avoid tickets and acci- !
dents. Driving behavior is influenced by these motivations, particularly in i
risk-taking/decision-maklngtasks. In order to encourage real-world-likebe-
havior we must attempt to s!mulate the real-world incentives. The problem ._
with simulating typical driving incentives is that they include some diffi-
cult-to-quantifyvariables, such as the subjective value of time gained by
driving faster and the subjective fear of low probability events such as auto
crashes. Negative reinforcement with electric shock is a classical experi-
mental technique and might serve to simulate the paln of an acclcent, but
this technique is difficult to quantify and recent subject welfare guidelines
make it unattractive. In a recent aircraft landln& experiment involving
pilot decision making (Ref. 25), the experimenters went so far as to inform i
their pilot subjects that they would be eliminated from the experiment in the
event they crashed in order to make them as averse to crashes as they would
be in real life. However, this approach would be logically awkward in this i
study because we would lose selected and trained subjects and, furthermore, :,
the majority of driving accidents do not involve fatalities. _ I
The traditional method of quantifying incentives for experimental control
is to relate them to some well-definedvariable with interval properties by _ "I
measuring indifferencecurves (Refs. 26 and 27). The most well-deflned,
widely studied, and widely used norm is money, primarily because of its in- :
terval properties and interchangeabllity. Money has some limitations; for /
example, the decislon-makingbehavior has been shown to be confounded by the
_ubJect's financial status. However, this can be experimentally controlled
by controlling the knowledge of results (Ref. 28). In general, the addi-
tional experimental effort required to scale other disincentives (e.g.,
shock, loud noises, etc.) has led to _idespread use of money for rewards and
punishments in decision-making experiments.
In both experiments the reward-penalty structures had multiple require-
ments. A major concern was that the subject complete the driving scenario in
a normal manner, with a reasonable motivation for timely progress and a de-
sire to avoid tickets and accidents; that is, we wanted the subject to drive
as if the driving situation were being experienced in the real world. A sec-
ond requirement was that the subjects return for participation in six
full-day experimental sessions. Finally, we chose to alter the penalty
structure in the experiment to determine the behavioral effects of increased
ticket penalty on the driver.
With the exception of ticket penalties, the reward-penalty structure for
both experiments was the same. In order to provlde a basic motivation to re-
main in the study, the subjects were paid an hourly wage. This payment was
received by the subject irrespective of _erformance. To facilitate comple-
tion of the driving scenario, and to encourage normal driving behavior, we _
used an additional reward-penaltystructure scaled to real world occurrences.
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Rewards consisted of $10.00 for completing the driving scenario, and
$2.00 for every minute of total elapsed driving time under 20 minutes.
Assuming a real world situation of leaving a bar intoxicated,, this rewarded J
the subject for making it home and for driving with the flow of traffic, thus
avoiding detection.
In both experiments, crashes (i.e., hitting an obstacle or adjacent car, ....
or running off the roadway) were penalized $2.00.
!
Tickets were given for running a red light or for speeding. Again to
simulate a real world driving experience, the traffic police were present
only 30_ of the time. In experiment I (the simulation), tickets were either
$I.00 or $2.00, depending on the group to which the subject was assigned. In
experiment 2 (full-scale), tickets were either $1.00 or $4.00.
Subjects received immediate feedback if they crashed (buzzer), or re- I
ceived a ticket (siren and red lights), but total rewards and penalties were
withheld until the completion o{ the experimental day. Again this simulates
the real world, because the cost of a ticket or crash is rarely known when
the incident occurs, i
RgSULTS AND DISCUSSION ]
To determine the suitability of our reward-penalty structure to the ex- /i
perlment, two criteria can be used. First, did all the subjects complete the
experiments? In both experiment I and experiment 2 the answer was yes, indi-
cating that we were able to keep the subjects sufficiently motivated to re-
turn. Second, to correlate our results with real world driving statistics,
we compared our simulator and field test results with epidemiological data of
over 7000 alcohol related traffic accidents. As evidenced in Fig. 2, the
simulator results and the field results compare favorably with the actual ac-
cident data, thus indicating drivers motivated to take comparable risks.
Finally, in our investigation of the behavioral effects of a change in
penalty structure, we found in experiment I no significant difference between
the $1.00 ticket group and the $2.00 ticket group. Experiment 2, however,
did show a significant difference between the $1.00 ticket group and the
$4.00 ticket group.
i
In Fig. 3 we see that the high penalty group in the field study had on
the average of one-third less tickets, with speeding tickets showing a
greater sensitivity than signal light tickets. These results are statistl-
cally significant as shown in Table I. Driving time dzfferences between the
two penalty groups were marginally significant (Table 1) and consistent with
the ticket results, e.g, larger time and fewer tickets. Payoff was not sig-
nlficantly different between the penalty groups, however (Table I), which in-
dicates a compensatory tradeoff between driving time and ticket rate.
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Some insight into the ticket reduction with increased penalty can be ga-
ined from the signal light risk acceptance plot shown in Fig. 4 (Ref. 30). !
Here we see that the high penalty group perceived higher risks in signal i
failures (i.e., running the red light) and was willing to go less often. The !
combined effect was much more conservative behavior for the high penalty
ii group, leading to better driving performance. The P(G) and SP(F/G) differ-
ences in Fig. q were statistically significant, but the SPA difference wasnot. No group differences were observed or accident data _n the experiment,it is
t and because of the magnitude of the ticket and P(G) group differencesassumed that these are true penalty effects and not Just between-group
"i differences. ,'
_J
A
t_
_' CONCLUDINGREMARKS
The following conclusions were drawn with respect to the reward-penalty
_ structure in our experiments:
; 1.0 -
Low Penalty Group( $1 Tickets )
High Penalty _
.75 - Group I
( $4 Tickets ) Risk Acceptance
Probability G Funct ions
of Going _ _'
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_. .25 -
% :::
! I I I , .i;
O0 .25 .50 .75 1.0 _.
PerceiveO Risk, SP(F/G)
Figure q. Hear Subjective Probability of Failure to Hake ]': Through
the Light If It Were Attempted
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m Driving is not intrinsically motivating to the majority o£
the population, and in experimental tasks is even less so.
Real-world Motivation incentives such as accidents, tickets,
and desire to safe time, are extrinsic.
Rewards and penalties must be tangible. Imaginary rewards
and/or verbal reinforcement are not sufficient.
I Rewards and penaltles should serve as general motivation, but
not direct feedback in the driving scenario.
m Between runs in an experimental session, overall performance
! payoffs should be withheld in order to avoid feedback or re-
inforcement which might modify behavior on subsequent runs.
i Our results show that employing a specifically designed mone-
tary reward-penalty structure provides sufficient extrinsic
motivation to duplicate a "real world" driving situation.
These results on reward/penaltyeffects on driver risk taking might be
extrapolated to real-world driving behavior. Perhaps drivers would drive
more conservativelywith increased and more evenly applied penalties for
traffic violations.
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